金融机构“大而不倒”中的道德风险及其防范  

Moral hazard and Its Prevention in Too-big-to-fail of Financial Institutions

作　　者：贾玉革[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学,北京100081

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2009年第8期40-43,共4页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：金融危机中,对于是否救助陷于困境中的大型金融机构,政府面临着两难选择:救助将强化金融机构"大而不倒"意识,引发道德风险;不救助将深化金融危机。两难中的较优选择应为救助与监管并举。救助是一时的应急之举,监管则是长久的措施。在金融监管制度的改革与完善中,应注重对大型金融机构道德风险的防范。In the financial crisis, government faces a difficult choice between bailing out the huge financial institutions or not. Bailing out may cause moral hazard, while letting them go bankrupt will deepen the financial crisis. At this time the best action is to bail out while enhancing financial supervision which could guarantee the long term strong financial system. And during the reform of the financial supervision system, the prevention of moral hazard of huge financial institutions is the most important aspect to consider.

关 键 词：道德风险 大而不倒 金融救助 

分 类 号：F830.3[经济管理—金融学]