怀疑论与新摩尔主义  

Skepticism and Neo-Mooreanism

作　　者：王华平[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学语言与认知研究中心,杭州310028

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2009年第8期1-6,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家博士后科学基金项目"心灵与世界问题的知觉哲学考察"(20080440208)

摘　　要：怀疑论怀疑知识的可能性。怀疑的依据即是怀疑论论证。阿格里帕问题和缸中脑论证是其中最有影响的两个怀疑论论证。传统认识论并不能很好地回应这两个论证。原因就在于它想一劳永逸地解决怀疑论问题,并且采取了不恰当的知觉理论。新摩尔主义以知觉哲学中的析取论为基础,可以说明经验何以能够提供有利于常识命题而不是缸中脑假设的证据,从而有条件地回应了缸中脑论证。新摩尔主义还可以采取新基础主义的方式回应阿格里帕问题。不过,新摩尔主义提供的是一种温和的反怀疑论方案。这种方案其实更适合于认识论。Skepticisms doubt the possibility of knowledge. Their doubts root in skeptical arguments. Two of the most persuasive arguments are Agrippa＇s problem and BIV argument. Nevertheless, traditional epistemology cannot dispose of these two arguments. Its failure is partly due to its unduly set goal which is to solve the skeptical problems once for all, and partly due to the inappropriate theory of perception it endorsed. Neo-Mooreanism is grounded on disjunctivism. It can account for how experience can provide evidence favors commonsense propositions over the incompatible BIV hypothesis. This makes a conditional proposal against the BIV argument. Also, Neo-Mooreanism can take the form of neo- foundationalism to dispose of Agrippa＇s problem. So far as it is only to establish to our satisfaction that we can justifiably believe commonsense propositions, neo-Mooreanism is a modest antiskeptical project. Nevertheless, this project is suitable for epistemology.

关 键 词：怀疑论 缸中脑论证 阿格里帕问题 新摩尔主义 

分 类 号：B15[哲学宗教—世界哲学]