低值易逝品的第三方物流收入共享协调合同研究  

Revenue-Sharing Coordinating Contracts between a TPL Service Provider and a Client Enterprise for Low Value Perishable Products

作　　者：吴庆[1,2] 但斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第3期40-44,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家863计划项目(2007AA040801);国家社会科学基金资助项目(06XJY020);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-05-0769)

摘　　要：对于一类低值易逝品,第三方物流服务提供商的物流服务价格会对客户企业的存货决策产生重要的影响———较高的物流服务价格会导致客户企业存货定购量的减少。为了协调这一问题,设计了一种收入共享合同。运用动态博弈模型论证了在合同参数满足一定条件时,收入共享合同不仅可以协调第三方物流服务提供商的物流服务价格与客户企业的存货决策,而且可以实现系统利润的最优、双方的共赢。最后,给出了相应的算例。For some perishable products with low unit value, the logistics service prices selected by a third party logistics service provider （TPLSP） have important influence on the inventory decision of a client enterprise, i. e., high logistics service prices bring decrease of inventories that the client enterprise orders. To coordinate the logistics service price chose by the TPLSP and the inventory decided by the client enterprise, revenue-sharing contracts are designed. And a model of dynamic game demonstrates that if these contract parameters satisfy some terms, revenue-sharing contracts can not only coordinate these benefit conflicts between these firms, but also achieve perfect outsourcing logistics channel coordination and a win-win outcome. Finally, a corresponding example is presented to illustrate the conclusions.

关 键 词：第三方物流 报童模型 博弈 协调 收入共享合同 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]