高速公路代建主体的设租和寻租行为研究  

Rent-creating and Rent-seeking Behavior of Agent Construction Participant for Expressway

作　　者：赵文义[1] 王选仓[1] 

机构地区：[1]长安大学公路学院,西安710064

出　　处：《交通运输系统工程与信息》2009年第4期20-24,共5页Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology

基　　金：国家西部交通建设科技项目(200531881213);陕西省交通科技项目(06-03R)

摘　　要：为了抑制高速公路建设领域的设租和寻租行为,介绍了高速公路代建制模式的内涵、寻租理论和信息经济学中委托代理理论的基本逻辑,构建了代建主体设租和寻租行为的三方决策模型以及设租和寻租行为对代建主体的影响机制模型.分析结果表明:业主存在设租行为的条件与其设租收益即代建人的寻租成本无关;政府监管部门可以通过加大监管力度和加大惩罚力度降低业主与代建人设租与寻租的期望收益;从代建人的角度考虑,业主的设租行为会影响代理成本,并将导致代建人和业主的期望收益降低,但不影响代建人对投资节余的最优分享系数.To restrain rent-creating and rent-seeking behavior in the field of expressway construction, the connotation of expressway agent construction mode, the basic logics of rent-seeking theory, and the principalagent theory in information economics are introduced. The paper develops the tripartite decision-making model with rent-creating and rent-seeking behavior of agent construction participant. It also documents mechanism model with the influence of rent-creating and rent-seeking behavior on agent construction participant. Analysis results show that condition of rent-seeking behavior of owner has no relationship with the rent-creating benefit, namely, the rent-seeking cost of construction-agent. The governmental supervision department can decrease expected benefit of rent-seeking and rent-creating of owner and construction-agent by enlargement of supervision strength and punishment strength. From the point of view of construction-agent, the rent- creating behavior of owner influences the deputy cost and causes decrease of expected benefit of constructionagent and owner, which cannot influence the optimal sharing coefficient of construction-agent to investment surplus.

关 键 词：高速公路 业主 代建人 设租行为 寻租行为 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：U415.1[交通运输工程—道路与铁道工程]