检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:ZHANG Zhiyong PEI Qingqi MA Jianfeng YANG Lin
机构地区:[1]Ministry of Education Key Laboratory of Computer Network and InfoT~mation Security, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China [2]Electronic and Information Engineering College, Henan University of Science and Technology, Luoyang 471003, China [3]The Research Institute, China Electronic Equipment and Systems Engineering Corporation, Beijing 100141, China
出 处:《Chinese Journal of Electronics》2009年第3期519-524,共6页电子学报(英文版)
基 金:This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.60803150 and No. 60633020), China National 111 Program of Introducing Talents of Discipline to Universities (No.B08038).
摘 要:A successful transaction of digital contents is primarily dependent on security policies, trust mechanisms and benefits balances, as well as the simple adoption of the combination of enhanced security policies would not effectively establish a trust relationship among various stakeholders in the DRM (Digital rights management) -enabling contents value chain. With respect to a generic DRM ecosystem, the hierarchy analyses of the multi-participant trust architecture were proposed based on the game-theoretic adoptions of security policies. By using formalized definitions of security components and services' utilities, we presented the choice of policies with the external relativity, in the contents acquisition scenario, as a multi-player simultaneous-move game referred to contents provider, digital services/rights provider and consumer. Also, in term of security policies combinations' utilities and benefit effects on participants, we further gained the game's Nash Equilibrium, which is a stable profile of security policies achieving the optimal balance of the security and utilities, thus establishing and strengthening the multiparty trust. The analytic conclusions show that enhanced security policies profile does not necessarily achieve optimal benefits balance in the one-stage game, for a small quantity of digital contents transactions. Whereas, the profile could transform into Nash Equilibrium with the increase of transaction sessions, meanwhile being Pareto Optimality.
关 键 词:Digital rights management TRUST Security policy Trusted computing Game theory Nash equilibrium
分 类 号:F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.15