银行高管薪酬与绩效关系的实证研究  

CEO Compensation and Performance in Banking Industry

作　　者：宋增基[1] 卢溢洪[1] 杨柳[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第4期59-64,共6页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金项目"企业理论"(70525005)

摘　　要：现有文献鲜有从银行业治理特性角度考察银行CEO报酬与绩效关系,大都忽视了银行业自身特性对治理结构的影响。文章研究从银行的外部监管、高负债比等方面,通过实证方法深入考察了银行CEO报酬与绩效间的关系。实证发现银行业的CEO货币报酬与绩效的关联敏感度要高于一般企业,且银行CEO报酬与相对业绩没有明显的关系。另外,结果显示银行业对股东权益的重视与一般企业无异,没有体现出因为高负债比而出现的差异。研究认为,相对一般企业拥有更为完善的治理结构的银行业,治理效果不容乐观。Existing literatures have little concern on the special governance in the banking industry when studying the relationship between CEO compensation and performance. And they most ignore the effect of banking governance structure. The authors analyze the relationship between compensation and performance from external supervision and high debt ratio in banking by empirical study. They find that banks have higher pay-performance sensitivity than common firms and CEO compensation has a loose relationship with relative performance in the bank. The result also shows that the bank and the common firms have the same concern on the shareholders. They argue that the effect of governance is not optimistic in banking industry, although they have more perfect governance structure than the common firms.

关 键 词：上市银行 CEO报酬 绩效 

分 类 号：F830.1[经济管理—金融学]