基于演化博弈的产学研合作稳定性分析  

The Analysis about Stability of the Cooperation of Enterprises,Colleges and Institutes Which Based on the Evolution Game

作　　者：张卫国[1] 李江[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2009年第5期25-27,共3页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

摘　　要：随着知识经济的到来,科技与经济一体化成为了当今发展的主旋律,产学研合作是科学技术转化为生产力的有效途径,同时也成为技术创新和经济发展的必然要求。产学研合作的稳定性,对于产学研合作各方来说都是至关重要的。基于此,相对于完全理性假设下的传统博弈分析,本文应用了"有限理性"假设下的演化博弈研究方法,考察产学研合作各方的收益情况与产学研合作稳定性的关系以及产学研合作渐进稳定的过程,通过研究发现合作与合作的纳什均衡只是产学研合作稳定性的必要非充分条件,而第一次合作意愿的大小与合作效应的大小是产学研合作稳定的重要决定条件。With the advent of knowledge-based economy, the integration of economy and technology has become the main theme of today＇s development. The cooperation of I-U-R （Industry-University-Research） is not only an effective way of transforming Science and technology into productivity, but also an inevitable demand of technological innovation and economic development. The stability of cooperation is crucial to each participant of cooperation of I-U-R. For this reason, this paper apply the evolutionary game analysis under the assumption of bounded rationality relative to complete rationality to study the relationship between the Profitability of parties and stability of The cooperation of I-U-R, and analyse the asymptotical stability process of the cooperation, and finally conclude through research： Nash equilibrium of Cooperation and cooperation is a necessary but non-sufficient condition of the stability of cooperation, and the will of the first co-operation and the size of the effect of co-operation are important definitive conditions of the stability of cooperation.

关 键 词：产学研合作 演化博弈 渐进稳定性 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]