反倾销税对现行出口退税策略的影响  

Study on impact anti-dumping duties based on current export rebate policy

作　　者：蔺江波[1] 钟根元[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（自然科学版）》2009年第4期489-492,共4页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce：Natural Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70673061)

摘　　要：在国外对我国反倾销案件不断增多的情况下,反倾销税对出口退税政策的影响不断增大.研究目的是为政府提供一种新的视角来审视出口退税政策的制定,同时也对企业在出口退税政策下的理性选择提供理论依据.在定产量的假设前提下,建立国外政府征收最优反倾销税率,国内政府确定最优退税率的模型,运用经济学、博弈论等原理分析,得出结论:国内企业和国外企业的成本共同决定了国内最优出口退税率和国外最优反倾销税率,二者的差距也决定了最优退税率和反倾销税率的差距.With the China＇ s overseas anti-dumping cases increasing, anti-dumping duties on the export rebate policy continue to grow. The aim of this paper is not only provide a new perspective to look at the export tax rebate policy for the government, but also provide the theoretical basis for rational choice of enterprises under the export tax rebate policy, This paper takes the assumptions that complete information at home and abroad, production is scheduled at the same time, establishes a model of foreign government imposed optimal anti- dumping tax rate, domestic government to determine the optimal rebate rate, the principle of economics and game theory, are used to analysis, conclude that the cost of domestic and foreign enterprises jointly determine domestic optimal export rebate rate and the best foreign anti-dumping rate, the gap between the them has also determined the gap between the optimal rebate rate and the anti-dumping rate.

关 键 词：反倾销税率 出口退税率 古诺均衡 垄断厂商 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]