龙头企业+农户的农村合作经济模式下的角色博弈研究  

Role Game Study of Leading Enterprises + Farmers Cooperative Economic Model

作　　者：刘云龙[1] 谢水清[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学财经学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第4期61-63,共3页Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：重庆市教委自然科学基金资助项目"农村金融资源系统与农村经济系统相互作用的动力模型及其均衡解"(编号:KJ080417)的部分研究成果

摘　　要：对龙头企业+农户合作经济模式下角色双方的博弈进行研究,角色双方都有机会主义动机,违约形式既有显性违约,也有隐性违约,重复博弈情况下角色双方更倾向于隐性违约。建立农户合作经济组织,加强政府监管,有利于博弈关系的稳定性和履约率的提高。Through leading enterprises ＋ farmers cooperative economic model study of the role of the two sides of the game, both the role of two sides have opportunistic motives. Breach of contract in the form is both overt breach of contract and hidden breach of contract, the role of repeated games where both sides prefer hidden breach of contract. The establishment of farmer cooperative economic organizations, strengthening government supervision is conducive to the stability of the relationship between the game and the rate of performance improvement.

关 键 词：博弈 合作经济模式 隐性违约 显性违约 

分 类 号：F321.4[经济管理—产业经济]