具有时变参数的短生命周期产品供应链博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Short-life-cycle Products Supply Chain with Time-based Parameters

作　　者：苏菊宁[1] 陈菊红[1] 杨变红[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学工商管理学院,西安710054

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2009年第4期436-442,449,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

摘　　要：研究了批发价格和需求预测精度都随提前期压缩而变化的博弈问题,提前期压缩使销售商的需求预测精度提高,却使制造商承担了更多的风险,因此,制造商会提高批发价格。制造商是领导者,先给出一个使自身利润达到最大的批发价格单位时间增量,销售商是跟随者,根据该增量,决定订货时机和订货量,采用逆向归纳法得出博弈均衡解。通过算例验证了有关结论,从中看出,通过采用合作策略,双方实现了利润增加和供应链的Pareto优化。This paper studies the wholesale price and demand prediction accuracy changing with lead-time compression, lead-time compression improves the accuracy of demand forecasts of vendor, but manufacturers bear more risks, so manufacturers raise wholesale prices. Manufacturers are leaders who first gave wholesale prices increment to maximize their profits, Vendors are followers, in accordance with the increment, to decide Ordering time and Ordering quantity, The game equilibrium solutions are gained by using backward induction. Finally, an example proves the conclusions, through the strategy of cooperation, the two sides increase profits and supply chain achieved Pareto optimization.

关 键 词：订货提前期 预测精度 批发价格增量 博弈 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济]