“规模-绩效之谜”三探——利润中心为何失灵?  

Tertiary Exploration into the Puzzle of Scale-Performance:Why Have Profit Centers Failed?

作　　者：沙凯逊[1] 杨杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东建筑大学,山东济南250014

出　　处：《建筑经济》2009年第9期5-7,共3页Construction Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助(70872064)

摘　　要：从建筑企业与建设项目之间的耦合关系出发,对"规模-绩效之谜"做进一步的探讨。考虑到建设项目的特殊性,国家标准《建设工程项目管理规范》要求建筑企业赋予项目经理充分的权力和职责,以保证项目的效率。然而,复杂的环境要求较多的外生变量来构成充分信息,导致企业监督项目经理的成本增加,结果造成企业利润中心名不副实。在这种情况下,剥夺项目经理的自主权就成为一种合乎逻辑的次优选择。From a point of view of the coupling relationship between construction firms and construction projects, the puzzle of scale-performance is discussed once again. In view of the specialty of production of the construction industry, a National Standard, the Code for Construction Project Management, makes it a rule that construction firms should give project managers enough rights as well as responsibilities in order to improve projects＇ efficiencies. However, complex circumstances require more exogenous variables to make up sufficient information, which increases firms＇ costs to monitor and control project managers, and as a result, makes firms＇ profit centers more in name than in reality. Under the circumstances, it is a logical second best choice to deprive project managers of rights to manage their own affairs.

关 键 词：建筑企业 项目经理 耦合 充分信息 代理成本 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]