基于风险分担的武器装备采办模型研究  

Research on weapon equipment acquisition model based on risk sharing

作　　者：李晓谦[1] 张志峰[1] 宋延平[2] 牟延亮[2] 

机构地区：[1]空军工程大学导弹学院 [2]中国人民解放军68222部队

出　　处：《系统工程与电子技术》2009年第8期1927-1929,共3页Systems Engineering and Electronics

摘　　要：从武器装备采办的理论需求出发,依据委托-代理理论的基本原理,对武器装备采办过程中军方与研制方的风险博弈进行了分析。以Mirrless-Holmstrom模型为基础,建立了基于风险分担的装备采办模型。对该模型的有效性进行了分析,并利用埃奇维斯方框图的直观性对风险分担模型进行了解释,对武器装备采办过程中风险分担问题的影响因素和注意事项进行了分析。结果表明:在非对称信息条件下有效的风险承担方式是双方都承担部分风险,研制方承担部分风险可以达到风险激励的效果,承担风险的大小受风险总量、风险偏好及风险成本的影响。The risk game theory in the weapon equipment acquisition process is analyzed on the basis of weapon equipment acquisition requirements and the fundamental principles of principal-agent theory. Then, the equipment acquisition model based on risk sharing is established based on Mirrless-Holmstrom model, the effectiveness of the model is studied, and the model is illustrated with Edgeworth box pane diagram. The influential factors and attentions issue of the risk in the weapon equipment acquisition process are analyzed finally. The result shows that under the unsymmetrical information conditions, the effective risk-taking method is that both sides take part of the risks, which can lead to the risk-incentive behavior of the developers, and how much risk should be taken by either side is determined by total risks, risk preference of the decision-maker and risk costs.

关 键 词：武器装备 采办 委托-代理 风险 博弈 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]