公司控制权、信息不对称与并购支付方式  

Corporate Control,Information Asymmetry and the Method of Payment for Mergers and Acquisitions

作　　者：苏文兵[1] 李心合[1] 李运[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学会计学系,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《财经论丛》2009年第5期67-73,共7页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572049)

摘　　要：本文以1998—2007年间我国沪深两市的253起并购事件为对象，从公司控制权和信息不对称角度研究了并购支付方式的影响因素，研究发现：（1）当主并方大股东的持股比例位于中间水平（30-60％）时，为避免控制权转移，主并方一般选择现金支付（包括承债支付）；而当持股比例较低或较高（超出30～60％）时则更倾向于股票支付；（2）交易双方的相对规模愈小，信息不对称愈小，主并方愈倾向于采用现金支付。但交易双方是否位于相同行业，对并购支付方式选择无显著影响。研究还发现，主并方的资金实力与现金支付正相关，而财务杠杆、投资机会、有形资产等因素与并购支付方式的关系不明显。The paper studies merger and acquisition （M＆A） payment choices of China＇s listed companies in 1998 - 2007 period, focusing on corporate control and information asymmetry aspects. The research shows that： （1） to consider the threat of the voting control, bidders prefer cash financing of M＆A transactions when a bidder＇s controlling shareholder has an intermediate level of the stock in the scale of 30-60%; （2） when relative deal size （used as a proxy variable to measure information asymmetry ） is smaller, the bidder is more likely to use cash. However, there is not significent relationship between cross-industry deal and choice of payment method. Furthermore, The results show a positive relationship between the bidder＇s cash volume and cash payment, no obvious relationship among financial leverage, investment opportunity, collateral and choice of payment method.

关 键 词：公司控制权 信息不对称 并购支付方式 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]