支付卡网络跨行交换费的利益博弈与规制研究  

Regulating interchange fees in payment networks:A game perspectives

作　　者：骆品亮[1] 殷华祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2009年第4期23-34,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-06-0361);上海市曙光计划资助项目(07SG10);"211工程"三期重点学科建设资助项目(211XK06)

摘　　要：跨行交换费是联结支付卡网络中各利益主体的"桥梁",通过调节收单和发卡机构的成本收益关系,起到平衡支付卡网络双边市场需求的作用.在竞争结构与交易规则外生的条件下,交换费由支付卡网络的多方利益主体在动态博弈中内生性确定.构建开放式支付网络的多方利益博弈模型以研究社会最优的交换费,为合理规制交换费提供理论基础.主要结论为:交易量与福利最大化的交换费通常是不同的,其差异取决于卡交易双方各自的平均净效用;商户竞争导致支付卡的过度使用,进而遏制非营利性卡组织最大化福利目标;卡组织的利润动机会在一定程度上缓解支付卡过度使用问题.鉴于目前我国支付卡产业规模经济性较弱的事实,建议侧重于限制卡组织的利润动机,而不宜过早引入卡组织的竞争机制.Interchange fees, or fees acquirers pay to issuers with respect to transactions between their respective customers, are a crucial determinants of price structure and transaction volumes in open payment card networks. We analyze the optimal interchange fees and the approaches to regulating interchange fees in payment network by game theory models. Firstly, we investigate the social optimal interchange fees under the objective of volume maximization and welfare maximization, and then we extend the model to situations of for-profit objective and combined objective. We prove that the difference between social optimum interchange fees and that of transaction volume maximization depends on the average net surplus of buyers and sellers, that competitions between merchants lead to over use of payment cards, and that for-profit objective of card association leads to reduction in payment card usage. Finally, we pay significant attention to the regulation of credit card interchange fees .

关 键 词：支付卡 交换费 利益博弈 营利目标 规制 

分 类 号：Q225[生物学—细胞生物学]