非对称信息下既有建筑节能改造经济激励合约设计  

Economic incentive contract design with asymmetric information in building energy efficiency retrofit

作　　者：韩青苗[1] 刘长滨[2] 张洋[2] 金占勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]北京建筑工程学院,北京100044

出　　处：《土木工程学报》2009年第8期129-133,共5页China Civil Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家发展和改革委员会/联合国开发计划署/全球环境基金(NDRC/UNDP/GEF);"中国终端能效项目"分包项目"符合市场经济体制的建筑节能经济激励政策的研究与评估"(EUEEP-B2.5-20060915)

摘　　要：利用委托代理分析框架研究既有建筑节能改造中政府向既有建筑业主提供经济支持的激励作用。通过比较对称信息和不对称信息两种条件下经济激励合约的设计,分析既有建筑节能改造中政府与既有建筑业主之间的利益博弈,确定了使委托人期望效用最大的合约参数。分析结果表明,非对称信息条件下既有建筑业主付出的最优努力水平小于对称信息条件下的最优努力水平;随着既有建筑业主风险厌恶程度的增大,经济激励的作用会减弱;既有建筑节能改造经济激励最优合约需要在经济激励与既有建筑业主的风险规避程度之间进行权衡。由此得出结论,提高经济激励合约效果的关键是:选择抗风险能力较强的节能改造项目;降低节能改造成本;通过建筑能效的信号传递机制来实现对业主努力水平的约束和监督。同时,政府应适度加大既有建筑节能改造的激励力度。最后给出一个算例。In view of the principal-agent relations, the effect of the economic incentive that the government offers to the owner of existing building for energy efficiency retrofit is studied. Comparing the design of economic incentive contracts with symmetric information and those with asymmetric information, the game of interest between the government and the owner is analyzed to determine the contract parameters so as to maximize the expected benefit of the principal by model optimization. The result proves that with asymmetric information, the level of optimal effort of the owner is lower than that with symmetric information. The effect of economic incentive is reduced when the owner＇s risk-aversion is high. An economic incentive contract has to keep a balance between the economic incentive for the owner and the owner＇s risk- aversion level. It is concluded that it is important to choose an owner with strong anti-risk capability for improving the effect of an economic incentive contract, to reduce the cost of the existing building energy efficiency retrofit, and to restrain and supervise the owner＇s effort level through some type of energy efficiency＇s signal transmission mechanism. It is also important for the government to enlarge moderately the scope of economic incentive for existing building energy efficiency retrofit. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the application of the proposed method.

关 键 词：既有建筑 节能改造 对称信息 不对称信息 经济激励 

分 类 号：F403.7[经济管理—产业经济] TU201.5[建筑科学—建筑设计及理论]