我国中小企业板与主板上市公司董事会治理质量比较——基于2004～2006面板数据的实证分析  

An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Board Governance Compared with SME and Main of Chinese Listed Companies——Based on the Panel Data of 2004-2006

作　　者：王维祝[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财政学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《经济管理》2009年第9期55-63,共9页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70672098);教育部课题(07JJD630002)

摘　　要：两类上市公司的董事会制度建设均随时间推移而有显著的改善,中小企业板上市公司设置了轻巧型的董事会,因而有助于减低代理成本;由于制度约束,中小企业板块上市公司董事长效激励好于主板上市公司,有助于实现剩余控制权与剩余索取权的匹配以及企业长期价值的培育;与中小企业板块上市公司多数为民营企业有关,独立性较差,董事长与总经理两职兼任程度较高,这有助于快速决策,但不利于制衡;中小企业板块上市公司更加重视审计委员会制度的建设,但其他专业委员会的建设则不如主板上市公司。The construction of board system of two Chinese types listed companies is significantly improved in resent years but still in the low--level stage. Listed companies are generally meet with the requirements of institutional constraints, but no spontaneous. The SME listed companies set up a light-- based board of directors which is helpful to reduce agency costs. Because of the institutional constraints, the efficiency of long--term incentives of the board of SME listed companies is better than that of the Main listed companies and it is benefit to match the control of residual rights with the claim of residual as well as the cultivation of long--term value. The independence of the board is worse because most of SME listed companies are private companies, the dual leadership structure of SME listed companies is good for rapid decision--making, but not in favor of checks and balances. SME listed companies pay more attention to the construction of the system of audit committee, while the construction of other committees are worse than the Main listed companies.

关 键 词：董事会治理质量 长效激励 中小企业板 显著性比较 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]