政府环境控制、环境会计控制与企业环境业绩——基于中国背景的理论与经验证据  

Environmental Accounting Control,Government Control and Environmental Performance——Evidence from Empirical Data of the Listed Companies in China

作　　者：姚圣[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《预测》2009年第5期8-14,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY028);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究资助项目(06SJD630058);中国矿业大学青年科研基金资助项目(2007A052)

摘　　要：基于"波特假说",政府一直以来都是进行环境控制的主体,但由于缺少制定政府环境控制措施的充分依据,政府环境控制的效果呈现边际递减的趋势。为解决这个问题,本文提出了企业应建立环境控制体系从内部进行环境控制,该体系不但可以加强企业内部的环境控制,提高企业环境业绩,还可以为外部的政府环境控制提供充分的决策有用信息,达到内外部主体相呼应控制的最优效果。为此,本文建立了理论模型来证明环境会计控制的协调作用,并使用中国上市公司经验数据进行实证证明。Government environmental control is always the primary force based “Porter Hypothesis”. However, because of short of the adequate basic information, the effect from government environmental control is decreasing. In order to solve it, it is suggested that the system of environmental accounting control be established. By using this system, not only the inside environmental control can he strengthened and the environmental performance can be improved, but also the government can gain the decision-making information, then, the optimal control effect comes into being. This paper con- stitutes the academic and empirical model to prove this harmonious function from the environmental accounting control.

关 键 词：环境会计控制 政府环境控制 企业环境业绩 波特假说 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]