双重目标下的最优医生激励机制设计  

Optimal Incentive Mechanism Design for Physician with Double Target

作　　者：王苏生[1] 孔昭昆[1] 向静[1] 周明建[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学深圳研究生院,广东深圳518005

出　　处：《预测》2009年第5期38-42,共5页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(70702010)

摘　　要：在医疗市场上,存在着严重的信息不对称,不同偿付机制会对医生行为产生不同的影响。本文建立一个双重目标委托—代理模型对按服务项目付费机制及预付机制进行分析,结果显示按服务项目付费机制必然导致实物医疗资源的过度使用;预付制的有效性则要求医生必须不以营利为目的,否则会导致医疗资源投入不足,影响医疗质量。针对这两种制度的缺陷,本文提出:通过实施"管理竞争"下的预付机制来达到降低医疗费用与提高医疗质量的双重目标。Information asymmetry is one of the most important features in medical market. The payment to physicians af- fects their behavior. In this article, a double target principal-agent model is be set up aim to analyze the physician as agent. The results of the analysis using the model are that fee for service induce practicality medical resource being used excessively and prospective payment is effective when the physician is non-profit or else the prospective payment brings the resource devotion insufficiency and influence the patients＇ health. Prospective payment with“management competition” can get over the disadvantage of existing payment system and achieve the target of lowering medical cost and elevating medical quality.

关 键 词：医疗市场 医生行为 信息不对称 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F934[经济管理]