不确定环境中利用薪酬合同获取市场信息的学习机制  

Acquiring the market information under environmental uncertainties through compensation plans

作　　者：朱振涛[1,2] 吴广谋[3] 曹杰[3] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,南京210093 [2]南京工程学院经济管理学院,南京210013 [3]东南大学经济管理学院,南京210096

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2009年第9期125-133,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：南京市软科学项目(200802001);南京工程学院科研基金(KXJ08076)

摘　　要：在不确定的多阶段动态博弈环境中发展了一种带惩罚项的销售薪酬合同模型,介绍了如何系统地通过观察调节合同参数引起的销售人员行为反应并运用贝叶斯推断学习基础销售量的方法,推导出了最优定额、产量和底薪的解析解;比较了信息共享和销售人员隐藏真实市场信息两种情况下厂商学习收益的差异,分析了厂商学习收益与地区销售环境、销售人员个性特征和技能水平、最初先验估计之间的关系,论证了两种情况下厂商都可通过对各阶段定额不同的设置方式来激励销售、获取新市场的需求信息从而优化生产计划和提高企业利润.In the course of developing a new target market, serious deviations of production plan from the real demand may take place due to deficit knowledge of the demand of new territory. Moreover, information asymmetry between firms and sales person may also increase firms＇ difficulty in learning the real market information. A compensation plan models with a penalty term for the multi-stage dynamic game under environmental uncertainties has been developed in this paper. In terms ＇of the methods of learning the knowledge of base sales level and optimizing the setting of quota, as well as the production output in the multistage dynamic game under environmental uncertainties, the analytical solutions of optimal quota, product output and salary are derived. The Bayesian induction is then introduced to adjust the contract parameters systematically to motivate salespersons and update the knowledge about sales response parameter of the unknown territory. The difference of the firm＇s gain from learning under two different circumstances： one regarding market information as shared knowledge, and the other as the private possession of salespersons, is discussed, and the principle factors which may have impacts on the improvement in firm＇s profits due to learning are also pointed out. At last, it is demonstrated that the firm is able to acquire the demand information of the new target market through properly adjusting its quota setting, and thus to optimize its production and to increase the company＇s profit under either circumstance.

关 键 词：企业管理 薪酬合同 合同参数 学习机制 多阶段动态博弈 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]