基于契约安排频谱的铁矿石市场价格机制研究  

Research on the price mechanism of ironstone market on the perspective of contract arrangements spectrum

作　　者：董方军[1] 袁伦渠[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100080

出　　处：《经济学家》2009年第10期24-34,共11页Economist

摘　　要：国际铁矿石市场的各种契约安排呈现一条从纵向一体化向现货交易逐渐过渡、连续渐变的契约安排频谱,从频谱的左端到右端,相应价格机制的刚性逐渐增强。由于构成铁矿石市场主体利润函数的各经济变量是外部环境和契约安排的函数,因此针对既定的外部环境,市场主体力求与交易对象达成使自身利润最大化的契约安排进而与交易对象围绕契约安排进行讨价还价。当这种讨价还价达到纳什均衡状态时,均衡价格与交易数量同时被决定,铁矿石市场随即达到均衡状态。自上世纪50年代以来国际铁矿石市场中契约安排重大变化均可被解读为外部环境变化影响了铁矿石进出口国的利润函数变量,进而均衡契约安排在频谱上的落点不断推移的过程。Various types of arrangements in the international ironstone market reveal a contract arrangements spectrum with gradual transition and continuous changes from vertical integration to spot transaction. From the left side of the spectrum to the right Side, the rigidity of the corresponding price mechanism is gradually increasing. All economic variables of the profit function of the ironstone market players are functions of outside environment and contract arrangement. As a result, as for the vested outside environment, the market players try great efforts to make contract arrangements of self profit maximization with their counterparts so as to bargain around such arrangements. When the bargain reaches Nash equilibrium, both the equilibrium price and transaction quantity can be determined, and the ironstone market reaches equilibrium. Since the 1950s, great changes in the contract arrangements of the international ironstone market can be considered as the influence of the changes in the outside environment on the variables of the profit function of the ironstone import- export countries, i.e., the process that the equilibrium contract arrangements go on the spectrum continuously.

关 键 词：铁矿石 契约安排 频谱 价格机制 

分 类 号：F113.3[经济管理—国际贸易]