上级干预下政府部门间信息共享的博弈分析  

Game-theoretic approach for information sharing between government departments under intervention of superior agencies

作　　者：楼一孺[1] 王洪伟[1] 杨德华[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2009年第10期3697-3699,3708,共4页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70501024;7071099);国家教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(05JC870013);上海市重点学科建设项目(B310)

摘　　要：电子政务建设的重点将逐步转向跨部门的协同办公,而政府部门间信息资源整合是其中的重要环节。上级政府的不作为极易导致下级部门的信息共享陷入"囚徒困境"。为此,利用完全信息下的静态和动态博弈模型,针对上级主管机构间接干预的处理方式,分析下级部门在信息资源共享过程中的理性决策行为,并指出奖惩手段和额度的确定方法;最后给出政府改进信息共享的对策。The focus of e-government is gradually being shifted to inter-departmental coordination, where, the information sharing between governmental departments is one of the important aspects. However, the lack of the intervention from superior agencies will lead information-sharing into the state of prisoner＇ s dilemma. This paper set up a static game model and a dynamic game model with complete information respectively, which described rational decision-making process of governments in information sharing between governmental departments under the intervention of superior agencies. Based on the two game models, gave some advises on how to determine the amount and means of rewards and punishments to the superior management agencies. Finally, this paper put forward some suggestions to improve information sharing in practice.

关 键 词：信息共享 博弈论 电子政府 

分 类 号：TP301.6[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]