盲人如何“看”路?——从知觉缺失情况看认知问题  

How Does a Blind Man "Look at" the Road?——Discussing the Cognition from Imperception

作　　者：李侠[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学科学史与科学哲学系,上海200240

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2009年第5期18-27,共10页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"基于计算心理学框架下的表征自然化问题研究"(08BZX019)

摘　　要：通过对盲人看路现象的分析,揭示了在知觉缺失状态下人类认知中的领域特殊性问题,并根据福多的心理模块理论探讨了心理表征形成的条件与限制。根据对"图林测试"与"汉语屋"实验的再思考,分析了心理内容的表征问题以及句法与语义之间的结合问题,进而探讨了心理计算理论的结构问题,在此基础上详细剖析了概念性经验与非概念性经验的表征特点,并分析了思想语言假设在解释心理表征中存在的问题。According to the phenomemon how a blind man look at the road, the paper analyses the domain specificity of man＇ s cognition when the perception has been defaulted. At the same time, it discusses the formative conditions and the limitations of the mental representation, which is based on the mental modularity theory of Jerry. Fodor. Rethinking the cases of Turning Test and Chinese Room, we find it is useful for us to analyze the representation of mental content and the combination of syntax and semantic meaning. Then, the paper probes the structural questions of the computational theory of mind also. The focal point of the paper is to analyze the representation characteristic of conceptual experience and non - conceptual experience, and the problem when language of thought hypothesis is used to resolve mental representation.

关 键 词：知觉缺失 认知 领域特殊性 概念性经验 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]