专利技术垄断、仿冒进入与政府管制政策  

Patent Monopoly,the Entry of Firms Counterfeiting Goods and Policies of Government Supervision

作　　者：张晖[1] 吴义杰[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院应用经济学博士后流动站,广东广州564003 [2]南京大学商学院理论经济学博士后流动站,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《财经研究》2009年第10期116-125,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金(Y2007H11)

摘　　要：文章通过构建政府、正版厂商与仿冒厂商三者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并考虑仿冒品厂商的市场结构特征和性质,探讨了仿冒厂商进入条件下正版厂商的竞争行为、策略以及社会福利水平的变化。经研究发现:(1)市场中有仿冒厂商进入且政府稽查力度较弱的情况下,正版厂商总会选择大于独占均衡时的产出数量作为竞争的最优策略,并且,正版品的市场均衡价格要低于正版品独占时的市场均衡价格;(2)仿冒品和正版品之间具有相互替代性,但替代程度不同,仿冒品对正版品仅能部分替代,正版品对仿冒品产生完全替代作用;(3)仿冒品的存在有可能对正版厂商的利益产生正面的影响和作用;(4)在没有考虑政府管制成本的情况下,政府采取对仿冒品不予追究,或者采取严格的查处力度都会提高社会的福利水平。Counterfeit goods are common in any markets. By establishing a Staekelberg game model among the governments, firms manufacturing genuine goods and firms counterfeiting goods and considering the market structure features of firms counterfeiting goods, the paper discusses the competition behaviours and strategies of firms manufacturing genuine goods and the changes of social welfare under the condition of the entry firms counterfeiting goods. The results are as follows： firstly, under the condition of the entry of firms counterfeiting goods and the weak government supervision, the firms manufacturing genuine goods usually choice the strategy that the output is bigger that the one when there are only genius goods in the market as the optimal strategy, and the equilibrium price of genuine goods is lower than the one when there are only genius goods; secondly, counterfeit goods are the partial substitute for genuine goods and genuine：goods are the complete substitute for counterfeit goods; thirdly, counterfeit goods may have positive effects on the interests of the firms manufacturing genuine goods; fourthly, without the consideration of the costs of government supervision, it will increase the social welfare when the governments do not investigate counterfeit goods or take strict measures.

关 键 词：正版品 仿冒品 垄断 竞争策略 政府管制 社会福利 

分 类 号：F062.3[经济管理—政治经济学] F123.16