董事会治理、产品市场竞争与公司绩效:理论分析与实证研究  

Board of Directors,Product Market Competition and Firm Performance:Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Research

作　　者：宋增基[1] 李春红[1] 卢溢洪[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理评论》2009年第9期120-128,共9页Management Review

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金项目资助(70525005)

摘　　要：本文对中国国有上市公司1999-2004年度数据的研究发现:首先,在用不同的财务指标度量公司绩效时,代理理论和资源依赖理论均在一定程度上得到支撑。而结合代理理论和资源依赖理论更有助于全面理解中国国有上市公司董事会治理效率。其次,通过引入董事会与产品市场竞争的交互项,研究表明董事会与产品市场竞争具有显著的替代性。这个结果暗示,尽管单个董事会治理和产品市场竞争因素都是解释中国国有企业绩效提升的基本因素,但由于它们都只强调公司治理中的一个方面而忽略了可能存在的其他更加重要的内容,因而都是不完善的。董事会治理和产品市场竞争两个都非常重要,因而都应得到足够的重视。第三,董事会与政府的紧密关系对公司绩效显著正相关,代理理论和资源依赖理论对此的解释存在较大的差异。但这个结果从另一角度说明,在转轨经济背景下,明确划清政府与企业的界限,杜绝政企之间的不良关系,对中国市场经济改革意义重大。For 528 firms over the 1999-2004 periods in China stock exchange, we find that：first, considering a series of financial index denoting firm performance, we find that both agency theory and resource dependence theory can explain the relationship between board of directors and firm performance, and integrating the two theories can help us comprehensively understand the governance efficiency of board in Chinese listed companies. Second, the statistical results of the mutual term of board of directors and product market competition imply that the two governance mechanisms are remarkably inter-replaceable. We should attach importance to the two governance mechanisms simultaneously. Third, close relationship between board of directors and the government is positively related to firm performance, but the agency theory and resource dependence theory have different commentary to this statistical result. The result potentially suggests that we should make a clear distinction between the government and enterprises in transition economy.

关 键 词：董事会 产品市场竞争 公司绩效 国有企业改革 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F276.6