我国国有(控股)商业银行道德风险治理研究  

Moral Hazard Governance in Chinese State-owned(Holding)Commercial Banks

作　　者：卫功琦[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京农业大学经济管理学院 [2]中国银监会银行监管一部

出　　处：《金融论坛》2009年第10期74-80,共7页Finance Forum

摘　　要：道德风险普遍存在于商业银行经营管理之中,严重影响银行的稳健经营和持续发展。本文回顾了道德风险治理的基本理论,探讨了我国国有(控股)商业银行道德风险的主要表现、治理经验和监管新原则。文章认为,产权主体缺位、激励机制不当、政府隐性担保以及社会信用缺失是诱发我国国有(控股)商业银行道德风险的主要因素。最后文章结合我国实际,从完善公司治理、实施激励相容监管、强化市场约束和文化建设等方面,提出了我国国有(控股)商业银行道德风险治理的建议,以提高防范和控制银行道德风险的能力和水平。The widely existing moral hazard in commercial banks＇ operation and management have already restricted the steady and sustainable development of commercial banks. This paper reviews the basic theory of moral hazard governance and discusses the main forms of moral hazard, governance experience and new regulation principles. The paper points out that the main factors inducing moral hazard include absence of property right subject, inappropriate incentive mechanism, implicit guarantee of government and lack of social credit. With consideration of China＇s actual conditions, the paper proposes that Chinese state-owned （holding） commercial banks should take measures to improve their ability in guarding against and controlling moral hazard from the perspectives of corporate governance, incentive compatible regulation, market discipline and corporate culture construction.

关 键 词：商业银行 道德风险 委托-代理理论 激励相容 监管原则 

分 类 号：F832.2[经济管理—金融学]