设计链联盟的信用博弈分析  

Analysis of Credit Game for Design Chain Alliance

作　　者：郭永辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州航空工业管理学院管理科学与工程学院,河南郑州450015

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2009年第19期22-24,共3页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：河南省政府决策招标课题(B434);航空科学基金(2007ZG55006)

摘　　要：设计链作为产品研发的发展趋势,其联盟活动中的信用问题是影响设计链正常运转的重要因素之一。从混合战略博弈角度,推导出混合战略均衡时设计链参与企业的期望效用公式,进而指出设计链参与企业的信用等级直接受到两方面因素的影响,即联盟活动所带来的最大收益和合作企业保守信用的概率。最后,给出建立规范、高效的设计链信用机制的几点建议。Design chain is the development trend of product development. Credit problem in design chain alliance activities is an important factor to hinder the normal operation of design chain. With the mix strategy game theory ,the expected utility formulas for enterprises in design chain are obtained. An important conclusion is given. That is,credit grade for enterprises in design chain is affected by the expected revenue from alliance activities and the credit probability for cooperative enterprises. Finally, several suggestions are given to construct an normative and efficient credit mechanism for design chain.

关 键 词：设计链联盟 信用博弈 信用机制 期望效用 

分 类 号：TB47[一般工业技术—工业设计]