非互惠接入定价、F-M模式与电信网络竞争：解释及政策含义  

Non-reciprocal Access Pricing,F-M Model and Telecom Network Competition:Explanation and Policy Implications

作　　者：安玉兴[1] 田华[2] 李宇[3] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳工程学院,沈阳110136 [2]辽宁大学,沈阳110036 [3]北财经大学,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《云南财经大学学报》2009年第5期134-140,共7页Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目:“反价格合谋的激励性执法政策研究”(08BJY095);辽宁省教育厅资助项目:“3G视角下网络效应、接入定价与电信竞争--理论及政策含义(2009A532);辽宁省社科基金资助项目:“辽宁ICT产业竞争与公共政策问题研究”(L07BJY042)

摘　　要：中国电信市场的分业经营以及接入价格的强制性非对称管制导致移动对固定网络的替代越来越显著。传统的纯网络竞争模型在处理F-M模式下的网络竞争时具有良好的借鉴意义。基于中国的实践,对传统的LRT模型进行扩展,以适合对中国的分析。通过分析发现,在非互惠接入定价下,F-M模式下的网络竞争对固定网络的影响是不利的,解决这一问题的方法是实现固定与移动网络的融合,进而促进中国电信市场的全业务竞争。The separated operation of Chinese telecom market and the compulsory and asymmetric management of access pricing lead to more and more substitution of mobile network for fixed network. Traditional pure network competition model provides reference meaning in dealing with network competition under F - M model. Based on the practice in China, the authors extend the traditional LRT model to make it suitable for the analysis in China. The authors find that under the non -reciprocal access pricing, network competition under F -M model has bad influence on the fixed network. The way to solve the problem is to realize the combination of fixed network and mobile network, and this will promote the full service competition of China＇ s telecom market.

关 键 词：非互惠接入定价 F—M模式 网络竞争 全业务竞争 

分 类 号：F623[经济管理—产业经济]