村民自治背景下的“两委”分工问题分析  

A Study on the Labor Division of Village Governance in Rural China

作　　者：刘明兴[1] 孙昕[2] 徐志刚[3] 陶然[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学中国教育财政科学研究所 [2]美国西北大学政治系 [3]中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所农业政策研究中心

出　　处：《中国农村观察》2009年第5期71-81,94,共12页China Rural Survey

基　　金：教育部社科基金规划项目"农村基础设施建设的长效机制"(项目编号:06JA790004);国家自然科学基金项目"农村税费改革后的基层政府转型和乡村治理研究"(项目编号:70703032);中国科学院项目"农业和农村发展的重大战略问题研究"(项目编号:KSCX2-YW-N-039)的资助

摘　　要：利用一组具有全国代表性的抽样调查数据,本文对目前中国农村党支部选举和"两委"分工状况进行了描述分析,并定量研究了"压力型体制"下影响村"两委"之间权力分配的主要因素。研究表明,目前中国农村村庄的权力分配格局实际上是乡镇政府、普通村民以及村"两委"等各方力量相互作用的结果。乡镇党委、政府对村干部的工作压力越高,权力越倾向于向村党支部集中;村民的集体上访越多,村"两委"之间的权力就越平衡。本研究旨在揭示"压力型体制"下村"两委"之间权力分配的主要制度动因、面临的结构性矛盾以及下一步的改革方向。Utilizing the data from a nation-wide representative survey, this paper describes the recent development of the labor division between Villagers’ Committee and Party Branch in Chinese village governance, and then quantitatively investigates its major determinants. Our results show that labor division in Chinese villages is a product of the power bargaining among relevant forces in village governance, such as local governments, ordinary villagers as well as Villagers’ Committee and village party branch themselves. Specifically, the degree of township governments’ administrative dependence on village cadres tends to shift the power in village governance from Villagers’ Committee to village party branch, and ordinary villagers’ collective protest behaviors may contribute to relatively more powerful Villagers’ Committees. This study highlights the institutional and structural origin of the power struggle between Villagers’ Committee and village party branch in the 'Villagers’ Autonomy' era. It also sheds some light on the potential direction of future reforms in this realm.

关 键 词：村党支部 村委会 选举 压力型体制 集体上访 

分 类 号：D638[政治法律—政治学] D034.5[政治法律—中外政治制度]