检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:闫大卫[1]
机构地区:[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061
出 处:《西安交通大学学报(社会科学版)》2009年第5期18-22,共5页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University:Social Sciences
摘 要:基于近年来新政治经济学关于产权起源的讨论,通过探索产权制度的形成与确立过程,描述了政府出现的内在机理。运用经济学的基本逻辑提出并证明了一个假设:社会主体在暴力与生产能力方面的差异性在产权形成与确立过程中具有至关重要的作用,社会博弈中最初的暴力垄断可能就是源于暴力与生产的比较优势所形成的专业化分工;这种比较优势的变化则是引发制度变迁的一个内在动力。同时,政府在诞生之初或许并不像以往文献所说的那样,仅仅是产权制度的"第三方实施机制",而很可能是在社会博弈中衍生出来的一个内生性角色。Based on the discussions in political economics over past years about the origin of the property right and through exploring the formation and establishing process of the property right system, the paper has depicted the intrinsic mechanism of the emergence of the government. By applying the basic logic in economics it has been a hypothesis that the difference of the social main body in violence and production capabilities is of crucial importance in the formation and establishing process of the property right, and the incipient violent monopoly in social games comes from the specialized division of work formed by the comparative superiority of violence and production, and the change in the comparative superiority is an intrinsic motive force triggering a change in the system. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the emergence of the government, contrary to what is stated in previous literatures - it is just the third enforcement mechanism for property rights, the government may be most likely an endogenous role deriving from social games.
分 类 号:F014.1[经济管理—政治经济学]
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.28