分权制下地方财政支出结构的内生决定  

Theory of Endogeneric Decision of the Composition of Local Governments's Fiscal Expenditure under Decentralization

作　　者：王晓姝[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2009年第10期7-14,共8页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：作为替代性制度,地方政府间的"晋升锦标赛"机制一直被认为是支持中国经济持续增长的动力,分权和政绩竞争可以对地方官员产生有效的生产性激励。但是,这种特殊激励机制的弊端也是明显的——其内生的不利于市场经济条件下社会福利型公共服务的供给,尤其是在构建和谐社会的情境下。中央政府的规制不能仅限于对传统体制的修补,针对地方政府负责解决的地方性公共服务问题,需要进一步深化财政收支体制和政绩评价体制的改革。As an alternative institution, the promotion tournament of local governments is always considered to be the positive power of keeping China＇ s economies growth ever since the implementation of the reform and opening up for the past 30 years. Decentralization and com- petition on performanee supply effective incentive of productivity. But the drawback of decentralization was also obvious, it is endogenetie bad at supplying local public goods about social weffare, especially in the situation of harmonious soeiety. The regulation of central government can＇ t be limited in amending the traditional rule only, the local governments take charge of local public goods, therefore we should deepen the reform of the fiscal system of revenue and expenditure and evaluation system of government performanee

关 键 词：分权 财政支出 政绩 

分 类 号：F015[经济管理—政治经济学]