常见拍卖形式的均衡出价策略及其特征  

Equilibrium Bidding Strategies and Features of Common Auctions

作　　者：龙永红[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学高级研究中心,湖北武汉430072 [2]中国人民大学信息学院,北京100872

出　　处：《系统工程》2009年第9期82-86,共5页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：对一个拍卖形式的各种性质和特征的分析都建立在我们对其中的竞价者行为的分析以及对均衡结果得了解的基础上。然而,在多数情形下,拍卖的均衡没有显式表示,但在风险中性的假设下,买者的期望报酬是可加的,它是期望收入和期望支出的差,这种拟线性结构为求解拍卖的均衡策略带来极大的方便,事实上在多数情形下我们能够得到解析解,关于拍卖理论的核心结论也大多建立在风险中性的假设下。本文的目标是对各种拍卖中及其在不同的假设和限制下竞价者的出价行为以及均衡结果进行归纳和总结。The analysis of the properties of an auction format is based on the analysis of the behavior of the bidders and the recognition for the equilibrium outcome. However, in most cases, a closed form expression for the bidding strategies is available. When we assume that all buyers are of risk-neutral, the expected payoffs is the difference that the expected income minus the expected payment. There are no explicit formulas to express auction equilibrium, however, under the assumption that the risk is neutral, the buyers＇ expected payoff, the difference between expected income and expenditure, is additive. This quasi-linear structure is very inconvenient to obtain the solution to equilibrium strategies of auction, we can actually obtain analytic solution in most cases, since most core conclusions of auction theory are based on the risk-neutral assumption. In view of what is aforementioned, this paper aims at summarizing the bidding behaviors of bidders and equilibrium results in a variety of auctions and under different assumption and constraints.

关 键 词：等价拍卖 均衡策略 风险中性 鞅 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济]