增价拍卖中投标者跳跃报价的收益效应研究  

Research on Revenue Effect of Jump Bidding of Bidders in Ascending Auction

作　　者：田剑[1,2] 唐小我[2] 马永开[2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江212003 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2009年第5期27-31,共5页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002);江苏省"青蓝工程"

摘　　要：跳跃投标是增价拍卖一种普遍现象,而跳跃投标是否会带来投标方的期望收益的增加是一个值得关注的问题。通过运用博弈论方法,分别寻找单物品和多物品拍卖两种情形下的跳跃报价均衡,计算出跳跃报价均衡下的投标方期望收益,并将其结果与非跳跃报价情形进行比较,给出了投标方希望通过跳跃出价改善其期望收益的一般条件。Jump bidding is a prevalent phenomenon in the ascending auctions. It is a concerning problem whether jump bidding can increase the expected revenue of bidders. Considering the two circumstances of single unit and multi-unit auction, the jump bidding equilibrium is respectively solved by the method of game theory. We calculateds the expected revenue of bidder under the jump bidding equilibrium and compares it with that under non-jump bidding. The general condition under which bidders can use the tool to improve their expected revenues is given.

关 键 词：拍卖 独立私人价值 跳跃报价 均衡 期望收益 

分 类 号：F713.359[经济管理—产业经济]