允许延期支付条件下退化性商品的销售与定购策略  

Deteriorating Products Sale and Ordering Policy under the Condition of Permissible Delay in Payments

作　　者：刘涛[1] 李帮义[1] 公彦德[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2009年第5期81-87,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金(07JA630039)

摘　　要：针对退化性商品,允许延期支付的条件下,分别从供应商和零售商的角度出发,利用斯坦博格博弈模型给出了其如何制定最优的销售和定购策略,以实现其利润的最大化。通过算例给出了这一问题的求解算法,并且分析了利率对于信用交易期限、供应商利润、零售商利润、销售价格、订购周期及订货批量的影响。为供应商信用交易策略和零售商库存决策的制定提供依据。This paper proposes the Stackelberg game model to get the deteriorating items optimal trade credit tactic as well as ordering policy subject to the single vendor-buyer supply chain under the condition of permissible delay in payments, in order to maximize annual net profit. Finally we develop an algorithm to solve this problem. Numerical examples are shown to illustrate the effect of sensitivity of interest rates on trade credit length, supplier＇s profit, retailer＇s profit, retail price, order cycle and quantity in the paper, which offer guidance for supplier＇s trade strategies and retailer＇s inventory policy.

关 键 词：退化性商品 延期支付 斯坦博格博弈 销售策略 订货策略 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]