基于第三方监理组织的虚拟企业动态监督机制  

Virtual enterprise dynamic supervision mechanism based on the third supervisory organization

作　　者：刘东波[1] 陈玉娟[1] 张自强[1] 顾幸生[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学信息与机电工程学院,上海201418 [2]华东理工大学自动化研究所,上海200237

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2009年第10期2073-2079,共7页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60774078);上海市科委科研基金资助项目(08JC1408200);上海市教委科研基金资助项目(10YZ78);上海师范大学科研基金资助项目(SK200741;SK200864;PL719)~~

摘　　要：为提高虚拟企业的效率和收益,依据项目管理思想,提出了基于第三方监理组织的虚拟企业结构模式。利用委托代理理论,建立了基于第三方监理组织的虚拟企业二级委托—代理监督模型,证明了第三方监理组织设定的报酬激励系数λ对成员企业的激励作用,比核心企业设定的利润分配系数β的激励作用更强,说明第三方监理组织对成员企业的监督和绩效评价是有效的。讨论了根据不同的绩效考核结果确定系数β和λ的设计机制,对多阶段动态监督过程进行了博弈分析。对系数β和λ随相关参数的变化趋势进行的例证分析,进一步验证了该二级委托一代理监督模型的有效性。To improve the efficiency and profit of the Virtual Enterprise （VE）, the VE configuration model based on the Third Supervisory Organization （TSO） was presented according to the project management principles. The VE twolevel principal-Agent supervision model based on the TSO was established by using the principal-Agent theory. Concerning the incentive effect on the partners, the profit incentive coefficient λ set by TSO was proved to be stronger than the profit distribution coefficient β set by the core enterprise. The TSO＇s supervision and performance evaluation on the partners were proved to be effective. The design mechanism of coefficient λ and β was discussed based on the partner＇s grading performance result. The multi-stage dynamic supervision process was analyzed with game theory. Some examples about the changing trend of the coefficient λ and β with the relative parameters were analyzed to further verify the effectiveness of the two-level principal-Agent supervision model.

关 键 词：虚拟企业 第三方监理组织 委托-代理模型 动态监督 绩效评价 利益分配 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F273.7