农民的强互惠行为与森林资源管理  

Strong Reciprocity of Farmers and Forest Resources Management

作　　者：韦惠兰[1] 吴香炼[1] 

机构地区：[1]兰州大学经济学院,甘肃兰州730000

出　　处：《江西农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第3期17-20,共4页Journal of Jianxi Agricultural University :Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(08BJY062)

摘　　要：林缘社区农民的集体行动对于自然资源的有效管理非常重要,许多实地调查发现,农民自主成立组织管护森林保护区形式多种多样,农民森林巡护队就是其中一个代表。从理论上建立一个关于自然保护区农民在森林资源自主管理中的合作博弈模型,结果表明强互惠者的存在有助于解决保护区农民在自然资源管理中的囚徒困境问题,而且强互惠行为塑造的合作群体结构能够承受住某种程度的外部冲击最终实现自我稳定。The farmers＇ collective action in forest edge communities is vital to the effective management of natural resources. Many of the field surveys found that farmers establish their own organizations to manage and protect forest preservation areas, of which farmer forest patrol team is a typical example. This paper, establishes a cooperation game model and proves that strong reciprocity is helpful to resolve the Prisoner＇ s Dilemma issue in the management of forest preservation areas. And to a certain extent, the cooperation structure by strong reciprocity will be able to withstand external shocks and achieve self-stability.

关 键 词：强互惠 合作 农民 森林资源管理 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学]