非对称信息下的三级建筑供应链质量控制决策研究  

Quality Control Decision in Three-Level Construction Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：苏菊宁[1] 蒋昌盛[1] 陈菊红[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学工商管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《西安理工大学学报》2009年第3期364-369,共6页Journal of Xi'an University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(10801110);陕西省教育厅科研计划资助项目(071C081)

摘　　要：为研究不同信息条件下三级建筑供应链的质量控制决策,建立了质量控制三方———业主、总包商和分包商的质量控制决策模型。分析了对称信息下业主的质量监督水平、工程款支付和总包商的质量控制水平决策。以此为基础,分别探讨了单、双层非对称信息下三级建筑供应链的质量控制决策。在总包商的质量控制信息和分包商的质量预防信息隐匿情况下,运用极大值原理得出了业主的质量监督水平、工程款支付和总包商的质量控制水平的最优解。并结合算例对不同信息环境下的决策结果进行了比较。Quality control decision in three-level construction supply chain is studied under different information backgrounds in this paper. A basic model is established of quality control decision among the owner, the general contractor and the subcontractor. The optimal quality supervision level and project payment of the owner and the optimal quality control level of the general contractor are discussed under symmetric information firstly. On this basis of which, the quality control decisions in three-level construction supply chain under single-layer and double-layer asymmetric information are separately analyzed. Maximum principle is used to solve the optimum solution to the quality supervision level and project payment variables by the owner and the quality control level variable by the general contractor when the quality control information of the general contractor and the quality prevention information of the subcontractor are hard to observe completely. At last, a numerical example is given, and the decision results come from the example are analyzed and compared under different information backgrounds.

关 键 词：非对称信息 质量预防 质量控制 质量监督 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]