BOT项目运营期内项目公司道德风险博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Moral Hazard of Project Company in Operational Period of BOT Project

作　　者：戴大双[1] 黄巫琳[1] 石磊[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,大连116024

出　　处：《技术经济》2009年第10期47-51,共5页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70572097)

摘　　要：本文在分析BOT项目运营期内项目公司道德风险的表现及其危害的基础上,运用博弈论方法构建了政府和项目公司间的不完全信息静态博弈模型。通过对模型均衡的分析,发现政府监督效率低于某一水平时,项目公司必然发生道德风险;而当高于该水平时,项目公司则以一定概率发生道德风险。最后提出可从增加处罚金额、提高监督效率、降低监督费用、建立民众监督机制等方面对运营期内项目公司的道德风险加以防范的建议。Through analyzing the behavior and harm of moral hazard of project company in operational period of BOT project,this paper establishes an incomplete information static game model between government and project company. The result shows that,when the efficiency of government supervision is under a certain level, the moral hazard of project company is inevitable; however, when this efficiency is higher than the level,the moral hazard of project company would happen with a certain probability. Finally,it brings forward several ways to prevent the moral hazard of project company in operational period,such as increasing penalties,improving supervision efficiency, reducing monitoring cost and establishing public supervision mechanism.

关 键 词：BOT 道德风险 运营期 博弈论 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32