完全信息静态博弈下最优相互反倾销税率模型研究  

Optimal model of anti-dumping tax rate under complete information

作　　者：张秀年[1] 钟根源[1] 秦向东[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《天津工业大学学报》2009年第5期76-78,共3页Journal of Tiangong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70673061)

摘　　要：通过构建一个由两个市场和两个国家组成的完全信息静态博弈模型,运用经济学原理得到国内与国外产品市场的均衡,同时根据博弈分析结果,得出在存在倾销的情况下,国内政府部门与国外政府部门如何确定倾销税,使国内与国外社会福利最大化.所得结论为:对市场容量较大、生产成本较低及运输费用较低的国家,政府应制定较高的反倾销税率,并根据结论提出相关的政策建议.Build a gaming simulation model in a stationary state, with two countries and their two markets. Market equilibrium should be given by it. According to the algorithm, when dumping exists, a certain dumping tax should be agreed upon by both countries, thus to maximize the social welfares for both countries. The conclusion is, government should make an anti-dumping tax on countries that have a bigger market, lower production cost, and lower transportation cost; On top of the anti-dumping tax, these certain countries should also be advised on their policies.

关 键 词：完全信息 相互倾销 反倾销税 社会福利 

分 类 号：F740.45[经济管理—国际贸易]