政府产业重组规划、信号博弈与企业兼并行为  

Government Industry Restructuring,Signaling Games and Horizontal Mergers

作　　者：罗云辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2009年第11期71-78,112,共9页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70603007);复旦大学文科推进计划"金苗"项目资助;"985"二期<中国经济国际竞争力研究>;"211"三期重点项目<中国产业的科学发展与自主创新>的支持

摘　　要：文章以2009年我国腾中重工公司兼并通用公司"悍马"品牌为现实索引,为水平兼并不存在"整合效应"的负盈利资产提供两种基于信号博弈的理论解释。第一种解释基于限制性定价的思路,说明在成本信息不对称的企业进行产量竞争背景下和在一定的市场环境下,总会对应一定负盈利水平的资产,使得低成本类型企业宁愿选择收购非盈利资产,以向竞争者显示其成本类型而得益。另一种解释引入政府推进产业重组的因素,当高效重组不同成本类型企业的概率条件和资产负盈利水平满足一定条件时,存在使低成本类型企业选择收购非盈利资产,以避免在产业重组中可能被低效兼并的分离均衡。In 2009, Tengzhong merged Hummer. On the background of this case, the paper raises two ways to theoretically explain negative-profit assets without integration effects in horizontal mergers based on signaling games. One way is on the basis of limited pricing. It states that under the output competition of enterprises with cost information asymmetry, some existing assets with certain negative-profit level make enterprises with low costs prefer to merger non-profit assets. The other way introduces factors which encourage governments to promote industry restructuring. When the probability condition of restructuring enterprises with different costs and the negative-profit levels of their assets are satisfied, there exists a separating equilibrium that enterprises with low costs merger non-profit assets.

关 键 词：水平兼并 信号博弈 产业重组 

分 类 号：F123.16[经济管理—世界经济]