大股东控制下的股权融资依赖与投资行为研究——基于行为财务视角  

Equity Financing Dependence and Investment Behavior under the Large Shareholder Control: Empirical Evidence Based on Behavioral Corporation Finance

作　　者：郝颖[1] 刘星[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2009年第10期73-79,88,共8页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70772100;70802067;70771118);国家社科基金项目(08JY154);教育部博士点基金(教技发中心函[2006]226号);重庆大学青年骨干教师创新能力培育基金重点项目;重庆大学人才引进基金的资助

摘　　要：基于行为公司财务研究视角,文章首先阐释了股票误定价影响企业投资行为的机制。然后,结合我国上市公司大股东股权融资的利益侵占动机分析,对不同股权融资依赖程度的公司投资行为进行了实证研究。结果发现:在取得了股权融资的公司中,股票市价与企业投资水平显著正相关;股权融资的依赖程度越大,企业投资水平对股票市价的敏感性越高;大股东控制与股票市价的交互作用对公司投资规模的推动效果,显著高于单一的股票市价因素。文章结论的含义与启示在于:尽管股票定价偏差的非市场效率因素对公司投资行为具有独立的影响,但其影响程度因公司治理模式和所有权控制特征的不同而存在明显差异。Based on behavioral corporation finance, this paper firstly illuminates the impact of mispricing on corporation investment behavior through equity finance channel. Subsequently the degree of equity finance dependence is measured, and the corporation investment behavior is empirically studied under the analysis of large shareholders＇ benefit. Conclusions are as follows： in the corporations which acquired equity financing, the stock price is positively related to the corporation investment level. The greater the dependence of equity financing is, the more the investment level is sensitive to stock price. The interaction between large shareholder control and stock mispricing has a greater push to corporation investment than the single stock price does. These conclusions suggest that though the stock mispricing independently influences the corporation investment, the degree of impact differs because the model and efficiency of corporation governance are different.

关 键 词：大股东控制 股权融资依赖 投资行为 行为公司财务 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]