流域跨区污染生态补偿机制分析  

Ecological Compensation Solution to Transboundary Pollution

作　　者：曹国华[1] 蒋丹璐[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《生态经济》2009年第11期160-164,共5页Ecological Economy

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才项目(NCET-07-0905)

摘　　要：本文尝试用博弈论的方法设计流域生态补偿机制以减少跨区污染。通过引入新的"生态补偿系数K"——需要通过各地区运用改进最终出价仲裁法来讨价还价确定其值,建立这个流域各地区政府参加的博弈模型;并具体分析在既定的补偿机制下,补偿主体与对象进行决策的行为过程。在既定补偿机制约束下,流域各地区可以根据本地支付函数建立优化模型,计算排污及污染转移量对本流域经济效益的影响,通过调整自身的排污量及污染转移量实现本地区的经济效益最大化,从而改善该地区生态环境。This study develops a repeated game to examine the effects of ecological compensation on transboundary water pollution in Three Gorges Reservoir area. Water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from districts in a shared waterway along Three Gorges area. It is divides into three parts. In the first part, an advanced model, with an ecological compensation parameter which is named K, is used to establish a new mechanism. K measures the multiple of the cost caused by pollution that defendant should pay for. In the second part, we address how to determine the value of K according amended final-offer arbitration. At last, we also give an example to show the process of mechanism running. In the sequential game, the players, local governments along the given river basin, move in turn. By game analysis, they can draw conclusion and make decisions. Results show that tile players could reach the highest income by controlling variable of water pollutants.

关 键 词：生态补偿 跨区污染 生态补偿系数 重复博奔 改进最终出价仲裁法 

分 类 号：F832.6[经济管理—金融学] X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]