谈判能力与审计费用的相关性检验——基于中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据  

Correlation Test of Bargaining Power and Audit Pricing——Empirical evidence from the audit market of Chinese listed companies

作　　者：苏文兵[1] 李心合[1] 常家瑛 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院会计学系,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2009年第6期13-19,共7页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572049)

摘　　要：我国上市公司的审计费用除受一些传统因素影响外,还受到审计双方谈判能力的影响。客户的谈判能力与审计费用显著负相关。但是,在由"四大"审计时客户的谈判能力对审计费用的影响不明显,而在由非"四大"审计时客户的谈判能力与审计费用显著负相关。另外,在由非"四大"审计时,大型企业、谈判能力强的企业能够获得明显的费用折价优惠,而小型企业、谈判能力弱的企业则不能获得这一好处。This paper found that, besides such traditional factors as： the size of assets, the level of stocks, the number of subsidiary companies, the performance in recent three years, the auditing opinion of the year, the bargaining power does matter in the pricing. Clients＇ bargaining power and audit fees have a significant negative relation. Further more, we found that ＂Big 4＂ s＇ audit fees are remarkably higher than ＂Non-Big 4＂ s＇. However, when a company is audited by ＂Big 4＂, bargaining power and audit fees have no significant relation; when a company is audited by ＂Non-Big 4＂, they have a significant negative relation. In addition, among the ＂Non-Big 4＂ s＇ clients, those who have a large scale and strong bargaining power will get a price discount; on the contrary, small-scale and weak bargaining power clients can＇t get this benefit.

关 键 词：谈判能力 审计费用 事务所 客户 

分 类 号：F231[经济管理—会计学] F726[经济管理—国民经济]