盈余管理、债权保护与债务违约率——来自中国证券市场的证据  

Earnings Management,Creditor Protection and Debt Default Rates——Evidence from Security Market in China

作　　者：叶志锋[1] 胡玉明[2] 

机构地区：[1]广西工学院财经系,广西柳州545006 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2009年第11期67-73,共7页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"银行主导融资下企业债券市场发展的契约期限与治理机制研究"(07CJY059);国家自然科学基金"企业金融契约和劳动契约期限的互动关系研究"(批准号:70602033);广西教育厅科研项目"盈余管理与银企贷款合约若干问题研究"(200812MS115)的资助

摘　　要：以1999～2007年的中国上市公司为研究样本,运用单变量比较和多元回归分析,本文发现微利企业的债务违约率与其左边相邻公司(即利润为负的公司)没有显著差异,但显著大于其右边相邻公司(即利润为正的公司),这表明盈余管理企业的债务违约率相对更高。中国银行业不能有效识别企业的会计操纵行为,这些行为导致银行资源的不合理配置和不良债权的发生。This paper selects these companies which are obviously with performance manipulating suspects as study samples.By comparing the loan default rates of these special companies with that of adjacent interval companies,the authors find that the loan default rates of these suspected companies does not have significant differences with left adjacent interval companies but significant larger than that of right adjacent interval companies.It manifests that Chinese banks can not effectively discern companies＇ manipulating behaviors,and this situation brings unreasonable resource allocation and non-performing loans.

关 键 词：盈余管理 债权保护 债务违约率 

分 类 号：F234[经济管理—会计学]