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作 者:张霞[1] 李卫光[2] 张水红[1] 谢立梅[1]
机构地区:[1]山东大学第二医院感染管理科,山东济南250033 [2]山东省立医院感染管理科,山东济南250021
出 处:《中华医院感染学杂志》2009年第21期2911-2912,2929,共3页Chinese Journal of Nosocomiology
摘 要:目的引入博弈理论,提高医疗机构在甲型H1N1流感防治的依从性。方法运用博弈模型,求解混合战略纳什均衡。结果检查比例、罚款额度、防治依从性之间存在着必然的联系。结论卫生行政部门降低检查的比例,医疗机构不认真防治的概率降低;卫生行政部门提高检查的比例,医疗机构不认真防治的概率也会增大。OBJECTIVE To improve the compliance of medical institutions in the prevention and treatment of influenza A (H1N1) by introduction of game theory. METHODS Solving the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with the application of game theory model. RESULTS There was inevitable relationship between the proportion of inspections, amercement amount and compliance of prevention and treatment. CONCLUSIONS If the health administration departments decrease the proportion of inspection, the probability will be reduced on the attitude of the medical staff; If the health administration departments increase the proportion of inspection, the probability will also be increased.
分 类 号:R197.323[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]
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