可交易节能证书认证机制合谋防范分析  

Analysis on Collusion-Proof for Authentication Mechanism of Tradable Energy Saving Certificates

作　　者：黄鑫[1,2] 陶小马[1] 邢建武[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海201804 [2]广西大学机械工程学院,广西南宁530004

出　　处：《经济管理》2009年第11期130-136,共7页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：上海市科技发展基金软科学研究项目"上海节能减排重大示范工程组织及评价研究"(086921034);广西省社科基金项目"广西节能减排对策研究-基于市场的节能证书机制设计"(08CJY003);广西大学科研基金项目"可交易节能证书机制设计研究"(X081031)

摘　　要：本文探讨了可交易节能证书认证机制的运行机理;运用博弈论构建了监管者和第三方认证机构之间的单次博弈和重复博弈下合谋防范机制模型,在此基础上分析了博弈双方的策略选择和行为。研究结果表明,在不对称信息环境下合理的审核机制、有效的监督机制、严厉的惩罚机制、具有市场导向的声誉激励机制能有效减少合谋的收益,提高合谋交易成本,从而把合谋控制在一定的界限内。The Operation of authentication mechanisms for tradable energy saving certificates is discussed. The models of collusion-proof mechanism in single and repeated game are built between regulator and a third-party certification body using game theory. The game players＇ choices and action are analyzed according to basis above. The results show that reasonable review mechanisms, effective monitoring, severe punishment mechanism, a market-oriented reputation incentives mechanism can effectively reduce the collusion income and raise the transaction costs of collusion in the environment of asymmetric information, then which control collusion to certain limits.

关 键 词：节能证书 核查和认证 节能量 合谋 

分 类 号：F062[经济管理—政治经济学]