建设工程评标委托代理的IC与IR研究  

Study of IC and IR in the principal-agent relationship in evaluating bids of construction projects

作　　者：舒美英[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江林学院园林学院,浙江临安311300

出　　处：《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2009年第11期1749-1752,共4页Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science

基　　金：浙江省教育厅资助项目(20060659)

摘　　要：文章运用博弈论中的委托代理理论,对建设工程评标专家的激励约束IC与参与约束IR进行了研究,从信息对称与信息不对称2个角度分析了评标专家的努力水平和实际收入、业主的期望收入,从IC和IR均成立I、R不成立I、C不成立I、C和IR均不成立分析了评标专家的努力工作水平、努力工作的成本系数、风险规避度及产出方差和业主的收益;分析表明委托代理关系中的IC和IR相比,IC更为重要,业主想要提高评标效果,就必须设计相应的激励措施,诱使评标专家努力工作,以抑制不道德的发生。In view of the poor performance of the bid evaluation committee, the incentive compatibility （IC） constraint and the individual rationality（IR） constraint in the principal-agent relationship between the bid inviting party and the bid evaluation committee are analyzed according to the game theory. The performance and real income of evaluation experts and the anticipant income of the bid inviting party are analyzed from the angles of the symmetric and asymmetric information. The performance, work cost, measure of risk aversion, and output variance of the bid evaluation committee and the bid inviting party income are discussed under the following different conditions, existence of both the IC and the IR, inexistence of the IR, inexistence of the IC, and absence of the IC and IR. The resuits show that the IC constraint is more important than the IR. If the bid inviting party wants to improve the bid evaluation efficiency, it must adopt incentive mechanisms which can make the bid evaluation committee work harder and keep the moral hazard under control.

关 键 词：评标 委托代理 博弈 道德风险 

分 类 号：TU723.2[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]