频谱拍卖中投标者共谋策略与多频段拍卖中共谋问题的讨论  

Discussions on Collusion Strategies of Bidders in Spectrum Auction and Collusion Problems in Multi-band Auction

作　　者：李冠宇[1] 宋起柱[1] 李研[1] 吕廷杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学信息管理与经济信息产业部重点实验室,北京100876

出　　处：《China Communications》2009年第4期45-50,共6页中国通信（英文版）

基　　金：国家高技术研究发展计划("863"计划)基金资助项目(2006AA04A106)

摘　　要：本文通过对单频段拍卖中共谋问题的研究,从抑制共谋的角度,提出了最优的拍卖机制是第一价格封闭式拍卖,论证了频谱拍卖中投标者的最优共谋策略,给出了拍卖方基于保留价格的应对投标者共谋的对策。在单频段拍卖研究的基础上,进一步将频谱拍卖中的共谋问题引申到多频段拍卖中,讨论了当待售频段之间具有互补性和替代性时的共谋情况。This paper, based on the study of collusion problems in single-band auction, presents that the first-price sealed auction is the optimal auction mechanism from the perspective of restraining collusion, demonstrates the optimal collusion strategy for bidders in spectrum auction, and puts forward countermeasures based on reservation price to response bidders＇ collusion. Based on the study of single-band auction, the collusion problem in spectrum auction is extended into multi-band auction, and the collusion situation when bands for sale are complementary and alternative is discussed as well.

关 键 词：频谱拍卖 共谋 保留价格 组合拍卖 投标者策略 

分 类 号：F713.359[经济管理—产业经济] F224