中国征地中的双重委托代理问题  

Problems of Dual Principal-agent Relationships in Land Requisition in China

作　　者：李菁[1] 刘玉琴[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学土地管理系,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2009年第10期52-58,共7页China Land Science

摘　　要：研究目的:运用委托代理理论和博弈论方法论证中国征地过程具有双重委托代理的特征及存在的问题。研究方法:归纳法,博弈分析法和图示分析法。研究结果:违法征地频繁发生的原因:(1)显性契约中的地方政府通过政治手段将隐性契约中的委托代理关系瓦解,致使显性约束力明显占优;(2)各利益主体在规则选择上存在不确定性。研究结论:征地制度的双重委托代理关系,使国家监督处于低效状态;行政权利过大,地方政府利益的一致化及隐性契约缺乏监控和惩罚机制都给违规征地创造了条件。The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the characteristics of dual principal-agent relationships and the existing problems in the process of land requisition in China through the use of the principal-agent and game theories. Methods of induction, game theory, and figure demonstration analysis were employed. The results indicate that the reasons of frequent illegal land requisitions are as follows： （1） the local government in explicit contract abates the implicit principal-agent relationship between the farmers and the collective economic organizations through political means, which results in the dominant role of the explicit contract in land requisition process; （2） the rules chosen by related interest groups are uncertain. It is concluded that land requisition and dual principal-agent relationships result in the low efficiency of supervision by the central government. Furthermore, overlarge administrative power, consistency of the interests of local governments, as well as lack of monitoring and punishment mechanism for implicit contract, all lead to the possibility of illegal land requisitions.

关 键 词：双重委托代理 征地 显性契约 隐性契约 博弈 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]