通道费的经济学分析——基于转轨期间中国的案例  

Economic Analysis on Slotting Allowance——Based on the Case of China during Transformation

作　　者：林娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2009年第6期80-87,共8页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"中国产业市场势力的测度及其福利损失的估计"(项目编号:70673106)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：从20世纪80年代早期以来,尤其是近10多年来,大型零售商利用其优势地位要求供应商或生产商交纳通道费的现象非常普遍。许多学者对通道费的效应进行了分析,得出的结论分为两类:一类为"效率促进"理论,认为通道费可以提高效率,增加消费者福利,是合理的;另一类为市场势力理论,认为通道费破坏了渠道关系,抵制了竞争,降低了效率。通过推理可以对零售商收取通道费的动因提供解释。由于中国转轨经济的特点,通道费问题在中国表现的更为明显,甚至成为零售商扩张的必然选择,仅仅通过一两部法规对这种行为进行限制无法解决根本问题。因此,在对我国零售商收取通道费的行为实施经济规制时,需要兼顾我国零售业的整体竞争力以及产业效率,采取灵活的措施,建立相对公平健康的竞争环境。From 1980s and especially the latest ten years, the powerful retailers take advantage of their dominant position to request suppliers or manufacturers to submit slotting allowance. Many economists have research on this field, and their conclusions can fall into two categories：The first opinion is ＂efficiency improvement＂ theory that some scholars think that slotting allowance can improve the efficiency and enhance the welfare of consumers, so it is reasonable ; The other one is the ＂market power theory＂ that some think that it will harm the channel relationship and damage competition, so it reduces efficiency. With mathematical deduction, we can provide the explanation for the cause and incentive of slotting allowance. In fact, slot- ting allowance is more common in China, Which is determined under the background of transformation and even the crucial choice, so it can＇t be solved solely by the enacting of one to two new laws or rules. Therefore, when regulating the behavior of retailers charging slotting fee to suppliers, we should take into account the real condition in China, and consider the overall competition level and industry performance in Chinese retailing industry, to implement flexible policies which are good for improving overall social welfare.

关 键 词：通道费 转轨 货架空间 经济规制 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济]