一类基于投入约束的资源配置DEA博弈模型  

A Data Envelopment Analysis Game Model for Resource Allocation with Input Constraint

作　　者：吴华清[1] 梁樑[2] 杨锋[2] 李勇军[2] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学人文经济学院,安徽合肥230009 [2]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《系统工程》2009年第10期104-107,共4页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金资助项目(70525001);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70801056;70901070);安徽省高校优秀青年人才基金重点资助项目(2009SQRS004ZD)

摘　　要：结合数据包络分析(DEA)与Nash讨价还价博弈模型研究有限资源的合理配置问题。首先证明,在投入约束条件下,基于传统DEA模型的资源配置方法将陷入困境。为此,需要考虑各决策单元(DMU)对于有限资源的竞合关系,引入Nash讨价还价博弈模型,并证明最优资源配置方案具有唯一性。最终通过算例说明了本方法的合理性与可行性,与其它DEA分摊方法相比还具有一定优势。Combining Data Envelopment Analysis （DEA） and Nash bargaining game, this paper deals with the problem of allocating the limited resource. Firstly, it is proved that with input constraint the method of resource allocation based on traditional DEA model will lead to dilemma. Therefore, considering the relationship between competition and cooperation among decision making units （DMUs）, we introduce the Nash bargaining game into traditional DEA model. The idea will yield a set of unique public weights, which leads to the common proposal of resource allocation accepted by all DMUs. Finally, conclusions are demonstrated through a numerical example, which shows its superiority compared with other DEA model.

关 键 词：数据包络分析 资源配置 Nash讨价还价博弈 效率 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]